News

11/2019 Stefan Fischer and I are organizing a Workshop on Moral Terms, Slurs, and Hybrid Expressivism with David Copp (UC Davies) at the University of Konstanz.

11/2019 Paper has been accepted

Prof. Dr. Jochen Briesen

Professur für Theoretische Philosophie

Philosophisches Seminar
Universität Heidelberg
Schulgasse 6
69117 Heidelberg

jochen[dot]briesen[at]uni-heidelberg.de

Research Interests

In epistemology/philosophy of science: skepticism, theories of justification and knowledge, epistemic consequentialism, epistemic values, entitlements, the problem of perceptual justification, theories of rationality, the problem of induction, the structure and presuppositions of inquiry, theories of understanding, disagreement, and epistemic injustice.

In philosophy of language: various forms of double-index semantics, the semantics of questions, the semantics-pragmatics interface, hybrid expressivism and double-speech-act theories, predicates of personal taste and other terms that combine classificatory and evaluative aspects.

In aesthetics : the meaning of aesthetic statements, the epistemology of aesthetic beliefs/judgments, the metaphysics of aesthetic properties, theories of art, the epistemic value of art.

For abstracts and penultimate drafts of (most) of my papers: philpapers.org.

Books/Bücher

Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie. München: Fink/UTB (in preparation). [co-author: Wolfgang Schwarz, University of Edinburgh]

Ästhetische Urteile und ästhetische Eigenschaften – Sprachphilosophische und metaphysische Überlegungen. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann 2020.

Skeptische Paradoxa – Die philosophische Skepsis, kognitive Projekte und der epistemische Konsequentialismus. Paderborn: mentis 2012.

Edited Volumes/

Herausgegebene

Sammelbände

Handbuch: Philosophische Ästhetik, hrsg. von L. Schmalzried, C. Demmerling & J. Briesen, Berlin/Basel: Schwabe Verlag (2025).

Articles/Aufsätze

(journals)

Publications/Publikationen

Articles/Aufsätze

(special-issues, collections)

Conceptual Infrastructure and Conceptual Engineering. In: D. König, N. Binder, F. Esposito, A. Pinnix, and A. Volmar (eds.), Rethinking Infrastructure Across the Humanities, Bielefeld/London: transcript (forthcoming) [co-authored with Steffen Koch]

Ästhetische Kriterien in der Theorieauswahl? In: Buchsymposium zu Olaf Müllers Buch "Zu schön, um falsch zu sein". Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (76): 442–446 (2022).

Epistemic Consequentialism: Its relation to ethical consequentialism and the truth-indication principle.

In: P. Schmechtig & M. Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter (2016).

Pictorial art and epistemic aims. In: H. Klinke (ed.), Art Theory as Visual Epistemology, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 11–28 (2014).

Articles/Aufsätze

(handbooks, conference proceedings)

Was ist philosophische Ästhetik? (zusammen mit Lisa Schmalzried und Christoph Demmerling). In: Handbuch Philosophische Ästhetik, hrsg. v. L. Schmalzried, C. Demmerling & J. Briesen, Berlin/Basel: Schwabe Verlag (forthcoming).

Ästhetische Urteile. In: Handbuch Philosophische Ästhetik, hrsg. von L. Schmalzried, C. Demmerling & J. Briesen, Berlin/Basel: Schwabe Verlag (forthcoming)

Unterbestimmtheitsargumente für den Skeptizismus.

In: Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, hrsg. von M. Grajner & G. Melchior. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag (2019)

Rechtfertigung und epistemische Berechtigung.

In: Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, hrsg. von M. Grajner & G. Melchior. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag (2019)

Why do we need a theory of art?

In: S. Majetschak & A. Weiberg (eds.), Aesthetics Today – Contemporary Approaches to the Aesthetics to the Aesthetics of Nature and Art; Preroceedings of the 39th Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg (2016).

Cartesian arguments for skepticism – Their interrelations and presuppositions.

In: O. Petersen/D. Brochers/T. Spitzley/ M. Stöckler (eds.), Nachdenken und Vordenken – Herausforderungen an die Philosophie; Proceedings of GAP7, Duisburg-Essen (2012).

A new problem for perceptual justification.

In: C. Jäger & W. Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement; Preproceedings of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg (2011).

Work in Progress

a paper on the relation of symbol-theoretic and institutional accounts in the philosophy of art;
a paper on the differences in aesthetic evaluations of art and non-art, collaboration with cognitive psychologists Claudia Muth and Claus-Christian Carbon;
a paper on a hitherto overlooked form of epistemic injustice;
a paper on response dependence and understanding;
a paper on the differences between aesthetic predicates and predicates of personal taste;
a paper on hinge epistemology and the structure of inquiry.

Aesthetic judgments, evaluative content, and (hybrid) expressivism. Ergo (forthcoming).

The acquaintance inference and hybrid expressivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).

In defence of science: Two ways to rehabilitate Reichenbach's vindication of induction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).

Sein und Kunst -- Zum epistemischen Wert der Kunst bei Heidegger. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (2022). [co-authored with Rico Gutschmidt]

Elgin on science, art, and understanding. Erkenntnis (2021). Online first: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00471-0

Der Urteilsbegriff und Wissen aus zweiter Hand in der Ästhetik. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (69), 4: 619–632 (2021).

"I like how it looks but it is not beautiful" – Sensory appeal beyond beauty. Poetics (79): 1–12 (2020). [co-authored with cognitive psychologists Claudia Muth & Claus Christian Carbon]

A linguistic specification of aesthetic judgments. British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (4): 373–391 (2019).

Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (71) 2: 183–222, (2017).

Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world. Philosophical Studies 172 (8): 2239–2259 (2015).

Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant's regulative ideas and Wright's entitlements. Kant-Yearbook 5: 1–32 (2013).

Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity. Synthese 190 (18): 4361–4372 (2013).

Antiskeptische Trittbrettfahrer des semantischen Externalismus. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (64) 4: 100–122 (2011).

Reconsidering closure, underdetermination, and infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien (80): 221–231 (2010).

Scepticism, externalism, and inference to the best explanation. Abstracta 4: 5–26 (2008).