© 10/2019 by Jochen Briesen

News

11/2019 Stefan Fischer and I are organizing a Workshop on Moral Terms, Slurs, and Hybrid Expressivism with David Copp (UC Davies) at the University of Konstanz. 

11/2019  Paper has been accepted

Freie Universität Berlin

Institut für Philosophie

Habelschwerdter Allee 30

14195 Berlin

Universität Konstanz

Fachbereich Philosophie

Universitätstrasse 10

78464 Konstanz

jochen[dot]briesen[at]uni-konstanz.de

jochen[dot]briesen[at]fu-berlin.de

Research Interests

In epistemology/philosophy of science: skepticism, theories of justification and knowledge, epistemic consequentialism, epistemic values, entitlements, the problem of perceptual justification, theories of rationality, the problem of induction, theories of understanding.

In philosophy of language: various forms of double-index semantics, the semantics of questions, the semantics-pragmatics interface, hybrid expressivism and double-speech-act theories, predicates of personal taste and other terms that combine classificatory and evaluative aspects.

In aesthetics : the meaning of aesthetic judgments, the metaphysics of aesthetic properties, theories of art, the epistemic value of art.

My current and future work tries to combine these research interests in a fruitful way. For example, I am currently interested in the relation of theoretical and practical rationality in the aesthetic domain, the speech-act theoretic classification of aesthetic and art-critical assertions, the epistemic value of art, the relation of art and science, and the epistemology of aesthetic judgments. I am also interested in expanding my interdisciplinary collaborations with researchers from other disciplines, such as:  cognitive psychology, linguistics, art and cultural studies.

For abstracts and penultimate drafts of (most) of my papers see: philpapers.org.

Publications/Publikationen

Books/Bücher

(A) Ästhetische Urteile und ästhetische Eigenschaften – Sprachphilosophische und metaphysische Überlegungen. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann (Im Erscheinen).

(B) Skeptische Paradoxa – Die philosophische Skepsis, kognitive Projekte und der epistemische Konsequentialismus. Paderborn: mentis 2012.

Articles/Aufsätze

(in peer-reviewed journals and collections)

(a) "I like how it looks but it is not beautiful" – Sensory appeal beyond beauty. Poetics (forthcoming). [with Claudia Muth & Claus Christian Carbon]

 

(b) A linguistic specification of aesthetic judgments. British Journal of Aesthetics (forthcoming, online first: 2019).

(c) Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (71) 2: 183–222, (2017).

(d) Epistemic Consequentialism: Its relation to ethical consequentialism and the truth-indication principle.

In: P. Schmechtig & M. Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter (2016).

(e) Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world. Philosophical Studies 172 (8): 2239–2259 (2015).

(f) Pictorial art and epistemic aims. In: H. Klinke (ed.), Art Theory as Visual Epistemology, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 11–28 (2014).

(g) Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant's regulative ideas and Wright's entitlements. Kant-Yearbook 5: 1–32 (2013).

(f) Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity. Synthese 190 (18): 4361–4372 (2013).

(g) Antiskeptische Trittbrettfahrer des semantischen Externalismus. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (64) 4: 100–122 (2011).

(h) Reconsidering closure, underdetermination, and infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien (80): 221–231 (2010).

(i) Scepticism, externalism, and inference to the best explanation. Abstracta 4: 5–26 (2008).

Articles/Aufsätze

(in Handbooks and Conference Proceedings)

(i) Unterbestimmtheitsargumente für den Skeptizismus.

In:  Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, hrsg. von M. Grajner & G. Melchior. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag (2019)

(j) Rechtfertigung und epistemische Berechtigung.

In:  Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, hrsg. von M. Grajner & G. Melchior. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag (2019)

(k) Why do we need a theory of art?

In: S. Majetschak & A. Weiberg (eds.), Aesthetics Today – Contemporary Approaches to the Aesthetics to the Aesthetics of Nature and Art; Preroceedings of the 39th Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg (2016).

(l) Cartesian arguments for skepticism – Their interrelations and presuppositions. 

In: O. Petersen/D. Brochers/T. Spitzley/ M. Stöckler (eds.), Nachdenken und Vordenken – Herausforderungen an die Philosophie; Proceedings of GAP7, Duisburg-Essen (2012).

(m) A new problem for perceptual justification. 

In: C. Jäger & W. Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement; Preproceedings of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg (2011).

Work in Progress

Art, knowledge and understanding.

[In this paper I discuss various epistemic values and consider the question with respect to which of those values our engagement with art might be conducive.]

Aesthetic judgments and hybrid expressivism. 

[In this paper I develop and defend a certain variant of hybrid expressivism with respect to aesthetic judgments.]

What is art? – Combining symbol-theoretic and institutional accounts.

[In this paper I argue that by combining the institutional theory of art with some symbol theoretic insights developed by Nelson Goodman the concept of art can be defined successfully. ]

Art vs. Non-Art

[Empircal study in collaboration with cognitive psychologists Claudia Muth and Claus-Christian Carbon.]